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Child Labor, the Wealth Paradox, and Common Forest          
Management in Bolivia 
Randall Bluffstone 
Abstract 
That wealthier developing country households may rely more heavily on child labor than poorer 
households has come to be known as the “wealth paradox.” This paper tests for a wealth paradox with 
regard to common natural resource wealth by analyzing the relationship between child labor and 
improved common property forest management (CPFM) in Bolivia. Data are analyzed using several 
econometric methods and it is found that households experiencing more effective CPFM generally use 
more forest-based and total child labor. The analysis also confirms others’ findings of a private wealth 
paradox with regard to private land and extends the analysis to evaluate the effect of ownership of 
animals. 
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Child Labor, the Wealth Paradox, and Common Forest          
Management in Bolivia 
Randall Bluffstone 
1. Introduction 
We know that children are important sources of labor in developing countries. The 
International Labour Organization estimates that in 2004 approximately 314 million children 
were engaged in work and 218 million did so in ways that contravened international conventions.  
These children provide a variety of services, including helping in the home, weeding farm plots, 
grazing animals, performing wage labor and cutting fuelwood and fodder (Basu and Van 1998; 
Basu et al. 2010; Kohlin and Amacher 2005; Cooke et al. 2008; Edmonds and Turk 2002; 
Grootaert and Kanbur 1995). Empirically, most child workers are in Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but child labor is important throughout the developing world and is believed to be rising 
in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. In many low income countries, child labor force 
participation is above 40% (Hagemann et al. 2006; Basu 1999).   
The linkage between child labor and forest management is of interest, because most 
activities done by children in developing countries – and, for that matter, by adults – are 
complemented by land. Indeed, it is observed that in many developing countries farming 
households with more agricultural land – the most important store of wealth in the developing 
world – often also use more child labor. That richer households may rely more heavily on their 
children’s labor than poorer households has come to be known as the wealth paradox (Bhalotra 
and Heady 2003). A “paradox” exists, because as Basu and Van (1998) and other authors (e.g., 
Edmonds 2005; Bhalotra 2007) have shown, typically, as wealth and incomes increase, child 
labor declines.   
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What concerns us here is that farming systems tend to be integrated with common natural 
resources, such as forests and pasture lands, and over 1.6 billion people depend on forests for a 
significant portion of their livelihoods (http://www.fao.org/forestry/28811/en/). Households 
depend on these common resources for fuels, animal food, building materials, fruits and 
medicines, but household labor is almost always necessary to access these valuable resources.  
The nature and source of those labor inputs therefore becomes an interesting topic, particularly 
as forest management improves and natural resource quality and value increase.     
The focus of this paper is on the relationship between commonly owned forests – a 
particular form of wealth that happens to be held by communities – and child labor. In the 
remainder of the paper, I estimate the effect of what is generally considered more stringent 
common property forest management (CPFM) on two types of child labor while accounting for a 
variety of econometric issues. The paper extends the empirical literature on the economics of 
forestry to consider effects on child labor and also adds to the literature on child labor in 
developing countries by extending the notion of the child labor wealth paradox to include 
commonly held wealth such as forest resources.   
To better understand past work, the remainder of this section discusses the key child 
labor and common property literature. Section 2 then presents data from the Bolivian Andes that 
are used to analyze the relationship between CPFM and child labor. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical approach and Section 4 the results. The final section evaluates implications and 
concludes. 
The services provided by children are widely regarded as important for households 
involved in very labor-intensive production systems and some have even suggested that 
household labor requirements at least partially explain high fertility rates (Filmer and Pritchett 
2002; Dasgupta 2000; Perkins et al. 2001). In attempting to explain the existence and persistence 
of child labor, recent economic literature has suggested that significant attention should be given 
to constraints facing poor households in rural areas of developing countries (e.g., Grootaert and 
Kanbur 1995). This literature builds on the seminal theoretical paper by Basu and Van (1998) 
and suggests that poor households in rural areas – particularly if households are unable to meet 
basic needs without child labor – are much more likely to use child labor (Edmonds and Turk 
2002; Bhalotra 2007).   
But many authors have also found wealth and income paradoxes. Bhalotra and Heady 
(2003) find that in Ghana and Pakistan households with more agricultural land also use more 
female child labor. Similar results are derived for Burkina Faso by Dumas (2007) and for 
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Ethiopia by Cockburn and Dostie (2007), who point out that in rural Ethiopia exploiting wealth 
nearly always requires labor. These and other authors cite lack of labor, credit and insurance 
markets as reasons households turn to children rather than hiring in labor.   
I would like to note that markets for key agricultural production inputs are also missing.  
For example, access to forest products like timber, fuelwood, fodder and grazing rights are 
typically imperfect or non-existent and therefore households generally produce and consume 
these goods themselves. Households often access these inputs through communal arrangements 
and it is here, as pointed out by Dasgupta (2000), Filmer and Pritchett (2002) and others, that we 
observe market failures that may distort forest labor supply. 
In recent decades, there have been important advances in our understanding of common 
natural resources and what is required to increase direct use values from them. A large literature 
has emerged that, for example, emphasizes the distinction between open access – where 
resources are not owned and access is free – and community ownership, where the resources are 
owned but ownership is in common. The theoretical literature has largely found that 
communities can coordinate effectively as long as incentives to cooperate exist (e.g., Olson 
1965; Dayton-Johnson 2000; Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Sethi and 
Somanathan 1996).   
Over time, almost a conventional wisdom advocating devolution of natural resources has 
emerged and many countries have legislated local-level management. Agrawal (2001; 2000) 
notes that more than 50 countries have ceded some control over natural resources. For example, 
devolution of forests has been underway in Nepal since the early 1980s and most forest lands 
were transferred to users in 1993 through the creation of forest user groups (Adhikari 2002; 
Cooke 2000; Pradhan and Parks 1995). Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya all have taken legislative 
steps toward forest devolution (Mekonnen and Bluffstone 2007). In Bolivia, which is the focus 
of this paper, communities have had control over many natural resources at least since 1952.  
In addition to devolution itself, certain policies are now regarded as best practices.   
These include institutional characteristics such as more public participation and democracy, fair 
allocation of forest resources and clear criteria for accessing resources. Management tools 
include clear rules for extracting resources, effective monitoring by villagers and officials, 
reasonable graduated sanctioning of transgressors and, if appropriate, payments for products 
(Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2000; 2001). 
As has been discussed by a variety of authors, a number of effects can be expected from 
more effective CPFM (Adhikari 2002; Bluffstone et al. 2008; Kohlin and Amacher 2005; Linde-
Environment for Development Bluffstone 
4 
Rahr 2003; Nepal et al. 2007). For example, Nepal et al. (2007) and Bluffstone et al. (2008) 
found that effective CPFM institutions spur on-farm tree planting. Adhikari (2002), however, 
raises concerns about equity effects in Nepal.  With the exception of Kohlin and Amacher 
(2005), however, for whom child labor is not a central issue, I am not aware of any literature that 
examines the links between CPFM and child labor.  
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We now turn to the data used to test whether more effective CPFM affects child labor and 
therefore offers evidence related to a potential common wealth paradox. Data come from an 
April 2000 survey of village officials and 378 households in 32 communities in the five Bolivian 
Andes departments of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Oruro, Potosi and La Paz. Surveys were 
conducted at the end of the summer rainy season when weather does not limit labor choices. The 
sample is stratified to include more villages and households in the more populated departments 
of Cochabamba, Potosi and La Paz (25% each) and about half this amount from Oruro and 
Chuquisaca.   
The household survey asks about 1) household characteristics; 2) forest management; 3) 
consumption; 4) production; and 5) assets. Average household size is 3.8 members and 66% of 
households have children, with a mean of 2.6. Eighty-seven percent of respondents primarily 
earn their livelihoods by farming. The village level survey includes information on village total, 
agricultural and grazing land area, ethnicities, institutions (e.g., land management, forestry), 
population and settlement patterns, with the primary purpose to offer instruments for IV analysis.   
In the Andes, average elevation is higher in the north (by about 500 m), but so are 
temperature and rainfall. Spanish colonization was concentrated in the north, which had a culture 
of private property earlier than other areas (Castro and Rist 1999; Moscoso and Villanueva 
1997). A variety of institutional regimes control natural resources in rural Bolivia. In contrast to 
the lowlands, highland forests have limited commercial value and have largely escaped central 
government control. In most areas, CPFM systems have therefore evolved locally – perhaps over 
centuries – with significant and idiosyncratic differences across communities. Our village survey 
suggests that, in some areas, there is de facto open access, with effectively no management. In 
the remainder, though, a variety of officials and locally developed, custom-based, often subtle 
structures regulate forests. For example, in some areas there are no official managers and 
residents agree on rules for forest use in village meetings. Others have officials involved, 
including mayors, council members, community directors and presidents, peasant union 
presidents, forestry directors and heads of committees for environmental protection.  
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Thirty-three percent of villages regulate forests based on formal laws, but all those also 
use customary rules. In total, 78% of villages regulate forests by custom and 22% have no 
regulation at all. Except for grazing and timber, few villages control extraction. For example, 
while 55% of villages regulate timber and one-third control grazing, less than 10% restrict 
fuelwood and fodder collections.     
Table 1 presents key descriptive statistics on household labor across six key activities 
during the week before the survey was conducted. We see that households work long hours on 
average. With an average of 3.8 members per household, 1.45 of them children, covering an 
average workload of 137 hours per week is likely to be a challenge. The most labor-intensive 
activity is agriculture, followed by household work and grazing. 
Table 2 breaks these labor shares down by age, but, because of lack of data, not by 
gender. Child labor is clearly an important, but not dominant, component of household labor, 
with 65% of households reporting no child labor. Among those with children, about half say they 
use some child labor. The 36 to 65 age group works most, followed by 16 to 35 year olds.  
Children, on average, supply about 9% of household labor, but do not contribute equally 
to all activities. They are especially active in household work (4.2 hours per week or 13% of 
total) and grazing (4.3 hours or 16% of total) and it is only for these categories that they provide 
more input than the elderly. Agriculture is significant (2.5 hours per week on average), but child 
labor is small relative to all other age groups. Fuel and fodder collection, which are small users 
of household labor, absorb virtually no children’s time and those 36 to 65 contribute most to 
fuelwood collection, which is physically demanding. No children participate in wage labor.     
Many households use no child labor, but, where it exists, I find that Bolivian parents 
allocate children tasks that are not too physically demanding, but absorb a lot of time. (Filmer 
and Pritchett (2002) find the same in Pakistan.) Though by no means concentrated in forest-
intensive activities, grazing is certainly one of the most important tasks. 
To estimate the effect of more stringent CPFM on child labor, I create CPFM indices 
based on criteria for well-functioning common property, as suggested by Ostrom (1990) and 
Agrawal (2001). Nine indices are created for each household using the formula in (1), which is 
used by UNDP to compute the human development index and is [0,1]. Aij is the value of index 
component i for household j and Mini and Maxi are the sample minimum and maximum for 
component i. CPFM variable definitions, means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.  
At the top is the CPFM index, which is an average of institutional characteristics and 
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management tools indices, which are themselves averages of specialized indices. All components 









Our CPFM indices are based on respondent perceptions. Perceptions are used for two 
reasons. First, in developing countries, on-the-ground management can often correspond poorly 
with stated policies. Perceptions therefore have the potential to better reflect reality. Second, 
“objective” measures of CPFM require interviews with village leaders or forest managers who 
might have difficulties characterizing the details of CPFM facing households. Perceptions 
therefore offer a better way to analyze detailed CPFM components. 
Table 3 indicates rather loose management. Mean overall CPFM index is only 0.31 and 
the mean of the management tools index is only 0.13. The institutional characteristics index 
mean is 0.45, but the mean clarity index is only 0.23 and participation/democracy 0.09. In fact, 
only 28% say that forest access rules are at least “somewhat clear.” Yet, despite few formal 
controls and apparent alienation, a substantial minority reports that officials and villagers 
monitor forests. Data also suggest that villagers are motivated by social pressures. Almost half 
say others would at least “probably” be unhappy or angry if they took too much fuelwood or 
fodder. A similar proportion would be embarrassed and many said they could lose privileges.   
The institutional characteristics and management tools sub-indices appear to be 
measuring different CPFM features, because they are very weakly correlated with each other (ρ 
= 0.13). We are therefore not concerned about multicollinearity between the sub-indices.
1
  CPFM 
varies across departments. The overall CPFM index is positively correlated with the 
Cochabamba (ρ = 0.32), La Paz (ρ = 0.24) and Chuquisaca (ρ = 0.19) dummies, but negatively 
correlated with Potosi (ρ = -0.52) and Oruro (ρ = -0.27). Management tools are positively 
associated with La Paz (ρ = 0.42), but in Cochabamba and Chuquisaca institutional 
characteristics dominate (ρ = 0.41) and management tools are negatively associated (ρ = -0.07).   
We do not have detailed qualitative information on the nature of CPFM in our 32 study 
communities and cannot shed much light on the reasons for regional differences. As shown in the 
                                                 
1 We also examine correlation coefficients between the more detailed CPFM indices. Other than a high correlation 
between formal penalties and social sanctions (ρ = 0.74), and modest correlations between the 
participation/democracy index and four management tools variables, there do not appear to be serious worries about 
multicollinearity. These findings are available from the author. 
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next section, however, villages in departments with higher levels of CPFM tend to have a greater 
area, be predominantly of the Aymara rather than Quechua ethnic group, and have management 
regulated by custom.   
3. Empirical Approach 
The empirical approach is to estimate structural models of total and environmental child 
labor, where models allow for the possibility that CPFM, household fertility and fuelwood use 
are endogenous. I also estimate treatment effects models based on nearest neighbor propensity 
score matching as an alternative to explicitly modeling endogeneity.  
This multi-faceted approach is taken because, as Heckman (2010) has emphasized, 
explicit structural models can offer important policy insights, but estimation is often difficult. On 
the other hand, treatment effects models are expeditious, but typically mask key economic 
relationships. He advocates placing economic questions and theory “front and center” in these 
analyses and combining econometric techniques as appropriate.   
Child labor variables are defined in two ways to derive estimates that are robust to 
dependent variable definition and econometric technique. Environmental child labor includes 
fuelwood collection, grazing and fodder collection, while total labor adds household work and 
agricultural labor. These are analyzed both as binomials, indicating whether households used any 
child labor during the week before the survey, and as total hours of child labor.   
Descriptive statistics are given in Tables 4 and 5. Environmental labor on average 
represents roughly half of total child labor, but the variance is much larger than for total labor.  
Mean total child labor is about 12 hours per week and 5.37 for environmental labor. About 35% 
of households use child labor and 22% environmental child labor. Censoring at zero is therefore 
an important data issue. 
A final refinement is that I examine both the full sample and the sub-sample of 
households with children. The full sample is analyzed, because it allows me to adjust for and 
examine any linkages between child labor and fertility; without including those households that 
for whatever reason do not have children, incorporating fertility decisions is not possible.     
In sum, binomial regression, continuous regression and treatment effects models of 
environmental and total child labor are each estimated for the full sample and for households 
with children.  These estimates are done separately for the overall CPFM index and its two sub-
indices. Because many households do not use child labor, we should be wary that decision 
processes involve sample selection (Heckman 1979; Linde-Rahr 2003). I test for sample 
Environment for Development Bluffstone 
8 
selection, but I do not find the inverse Mills ratio remotely significant in any model (p value 0.63 
to 0.75). I therefore do not report Heckman results, though they are available upon request. 
Without sample selection, the standard method when data are left-censored is to use 
Tobit, but this is correct only if the household’s decision-making process for deciding whether to 
use child labor is the same as for choosing hours of labor. I test this restriction by comparing the 
Tobit with the model of Cragg (1971), which utilizes a Probit for the first stage followed by a 
truncated regression model. Using likelihood ratio tests, I reject the Tobit as too restrictive at 
better than the 1% level (likelihood ratio χ
2
 = 89.23, prob. > χ
2
 = 0.00). I therefore present Probit 
first-hurdle results followed by second-hurdle truncated regressions with errors bootstrapped 
(1000 replications) (Guann 2003).2 Before presenting the double-hurdle model, 2SLS IV 
regression results are discussed.   
Our independent variables of interest are the overall common property (top of Table 3), 
institutional characteristics and management tools indices (second row of Table 3). Results on 
lower-level indices are available from the author, but are not reported in order to focus this 
discussion.   
The literature has debated the degree to which child labor and fertility decisions are 
linked (e.g., Dasgupta 2000; Filmer and Pritchett 2002). I therefore include children not only as a 
covariate, but as a variable of interest. I also attempt to disentangle the effects of forest 
extractions from the effects of more developed CPFM on child labor. Households cook 
exclusively with biomass, and fuelwood is preferred; therefore, use of more fuelwood indicates, 
ceteris paribus, that households get more of their preferred product. I therefore include total 
fuelwood use during the week prior to the survey as an independent variable.   
Independent variables of primary interest are potentially endogenous. I do not assume 
endogeneity, however, but test for it using Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests and find that we can 
reject exogeneity in the 2SLS model for the full sample at the 5% level at least.
4
 The model 
estimated is a separable rather than a non-separable model, as was estimated, for example, by 
Linde-Rahr (2003) and Cooke (1998; 2000).  In the literature, the marginal product in agriculture 
is often used as a shadow value (Singh et al. 1986), but, as shown in Table 1, such an assumption 
would not be appropriate.   
                                                 
2 Predicted values come from the regression models presented in Table 6. Truncated regression is applied only to 
those observations with non-zero values of the dependent variable. 
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Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for covariates and excluded exogenous variables, 
along with expected signs and the reasons for including them. The table indicates that, though 
generally poor, most households are integrated with markets, with 73% having gone to a store 
during the previous week. This is despite a mean travel time of two hours. Borrowing is difficult, 
with only 16% of respondents having access to credit from local moneylenders. Mean land 
holdings are 1.47 hectares and 10% of households are landless. The values are similar to the 
means for extremely poor households (income < $1/day/person) in a variety of countries 
analyzed by Banerjee and Duflo (2007). Ownership of large animals are limited, with less than 
half reporting that they have cows. Over 50% have sheep, with a mean of nine.  
The excluded instruments presented in Table 5 identify the first stage equations when 
tests suggest that CPFM indices, children or fuelwood use are endogenous. These instruments 
are chosen because they are highly correlated with CPFM indices, fertility and fuelwood use and 
are believed to affect village norms. They are also theoretically and empirically unrelated to 
child labor. For example, the mean and median Spearman correlations between excluded 
exogenous variables and total child labor are 0.17. Rationales for choosing these variables as 
excluded exogenous variables are discussed in Table 5. As discussed in the next section, we test 
the power of our instruments and find that have sufficient power.  Data are from household and 
village leader surveys.   
Villages have a mean of 535 households, are primarily Quechua, are evenly split between 
clustered and disbursed settlement patterns and generally have clear boundaries. About half have 
regulations for timber cutting and allow people to sell their land. Typically, though, forest 
management is determined wholly by custom, though some villages also utilize formal laws.  
The IV models are all over-identified. I therefore test over-identification restrictions 
using Sargan and Basmann methods and confirm that all pass these tests. Weak instruments are 
tested using Shea’s partial R
2
. All test results are reported with relevant IV regression results. 
The treatment effects models estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
using nearest neighbor propensity score matching.
5
 “Treatment” in these models indicates that 
households experience CPFM greater than the median value of the relevant CPFM measure 
                                                 
5 In all models, the propensity score specification satisfies the balancing property. 
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(overall CPFM, institutional characteristics, management tools). Propensity scores are estimated 
using the excluded exogenous variables in Table 5 and ATTs are estimated with all exogenous 
covariates as right side variables.   
As noted by Heckman (2010) and Kassie et al. (2008), standard regression analysis 
assumes truly comparable treated and untreated households. Propensity score matching helps 
assure this comparability and constructs a counterfactual that examines the effects on the treated 
had they gone untreated and vice versa. Estimates using matched samples also reduce 
endogeneity bias. 
4. Results 
I begin by briefly discussing first-stage CPFM index, fertility and fuelwood collection 
models. I then present 2SLS and Probit models of total and environmental child labor for the full 
sample and sub-sample with children. Sample sizes reflect the need for full-rank matrices and are 
less than 378 in all models.    
As shown in Table 6, a number of variables are associated with children, CPFM indices 
and fuelwood collections and, based on F tests, all models are significant at better than the 1% 
level. Adjusted R
2
 values are all higher than 0.33 and as high as 0.85 for children. These results 
suggest that weak instruments may not be a problem. No variable is significant in all models, 
though we find that respondents have systematically lower values of all CPFM indices where 
timber cutting is regulated.   
The determinants of fertility are perhaps of most interest. I find that households with 
electricity have on average one fewer child than those without those services (p  0.000). More 
educated households have fewer children, as do households with more sheep. The results 
therefore confirm results of others (e.g., Dasgupta 2000) that providing infrastructure and 
education reduces fertility. 
Table 7 presents 2SLS IV results for total and environmental labor for the full and sub-
sample of households with children. All models have substantial explanatory power, with Wald 
tests significant at p>0.000. In models using the full sample, I reject exogeneity of potentially 
endogenous variables, at least at the 10% significance level, and, depending on whether Wu 
Hausman F or Durban χ
2
 tests are used, at better than the 1% level in some models. For the sub-
sample of households with children, we cannot reject exogeneity in any model, suggesting that 
OLS is a better technique. OLS results are similar to those from IV; in the interest of brevity, I 
refer to them but do not present them. OLS results are available from the author.   
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That exogeneity cannot be rejected for households with children suggests that, while 
CPFM measures, children and fuelwood use are endogenous to households’ child labor 
decisions, because they are bound up with choices related to whether households have children. 
For example, child labor affects fuelwood collections (not only vice-versa) only as part of 
households’ decisions whether to have children.   
I test for weak instruments using Shea’s partial R
2
 and find, as shown in Table 7, that the 
instruments chosen are strong. That the value of Shea’s partial R
2
 is typically greater than 0.30, 
and often over 0.40, suggests substantial explanatory power of the excluded variables (Cameron 
and Trivedi 2005). I test the over-identifying restrictions using Sargan and Basmann tests and 
find that, for the full sample (where exogeneity can be rejected), 15 of the 16 models pass over-
identifying restrictions tests.    
I find that the effect of the overall CPFM index on child labor is positive and, for 
environmental child labor, is significantly different from zero with an elastic response (ε =1.13). 
In the OLS models not presented (i.e., for households with children), overall CPFM is positively 
correlated with environmental and total child labor and significant at better than the 5% 
significance level with elasticities of 0.32 to 0.45.      
Dividing CPFM into sub-indices, I find CPFM has very statistically significant effects on 
child labor. The institutional characteristics sub-index is correlated with more total and 
environmental child labor in all models for both the full and child-only samples (also true for 
OLS models with ε =1.1 and 1.28) and management tools are associated with less child labor. 
Marginal effects for the full sample are high, yielding elasticities of the institutional 
characteristics index relative to total child labor of 1.20 and environmental child labor of 1.9.  
Elasticities of management tools with respect to child labor are -0.65 to -0.80, which suggests 
these CPFM components pull in opposite directions.    
All models in Table 7 indicate that fertility affects child labor decisions, with more 
children (instrumented due to endogeneity) correlated with more total and environmental child 
labor. The response is elastic (ε  1.1) in models of total child labor and slightly inelastic (ε  
0.86) for environmental child labor; households therefore make child labor decisions based on 
their fertility choices and, because children are endogenous to the child labor decision, child 
labor requirements also affect fertility. 
Fuelwood use is positively correlated with child labor, with elasticities in the 0.40 to 0.50 
range. This finding indicates that more and better quality fuels are associated with the use of 
child labor; from a fuel quality and use perspective, given common access to fuelwood, child 
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labor and household welfare appear to go hand-in-hand. Because fuelwood collections are 
endogenous to the child labor decision, child labor also affects fuelwood collections. 
Relatively few covariates yield consistent results across samples and definitions of child 
labor. An exception is electricity, to some extent. The availability of electricity is associated with 
reduced environmental child labor in most models, which suggests electricity substitutes for 
household labor in ways that benefit children. As was previously discussed, the existence of 
electricity is also correlated with lower fertility. 
Among households with children, more educated households use less child labor and this 
finding is significant in some IV models and at least at the 10% level in OLS models. As shown 
by the positive and sometimes significant coefficient estimates on wealth variables (e.g., land, 
cattle and sheep), there is some evidence that wealthier households use more child labor.   
Table 8 presents Probit results for total and environmental labor.  This is the first stage of 
the Cragg (1971) double-hurdle model. I test for exogeneity of the potentially endogenous 
variables and reject exogeneity for environmental child labor, but not for total labor. I find, 
though, that IV Probit models of environmental labor cannot return marginal effects. I therefore 
report Probit results. IV Probit findings are available and similar to Probit models. 
Probit results are comparable to those from the 2SLS models. Overall CPFM and 
institutional characteristics are positively associated with child labor and in three models (total 
child labor using CPFM sub-indices) statistically significant, with elasticities of 0.78 (full 
sample) and 0.38 (sub-sample with children). Management tools are again negatively associated 
with child labor and are statistically significant for total child labor. Elasticities are -0.28 and       
-0.15. Number of children are positively associated with the existence of child labor (ε  1.0) and 
are significant in all models. Fuelwood use is also positively related to child labor in all models, 
confirming that more fuelwood is associated with the use of child labor; all else equal, 
households using more and better fuels require more labor – including children. 
Relatively few covariates stand out as especially related to the existence of child labor, 
though the use of tractors, and in some models, key wealth variables such as land, cattle and 
sheep, are positively correlated and statistically significant. Other variables, for example those 
related to market integration, are not significant. 
Table 9 presents truncated regression results, which is the second hurdle of the Cragg 
(1971) model. CPFM coefficient estimates are consistent with previous models. Overall CPFM 
and institutional characteristics indices are positively correlated with child labor, while 
management tools are negatively correlated with child labor for households that use any child 
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labor. In the full sample, no CPFM estimates are statistically significant, but management tools 
are significant in the sub-sample. In contrast to other models, number of children are 
significantly – but negatively – associated with child labor. This suggests that fertility indeed 
affects child labor choices, but once we break the child labor decision into binary and continuous 
parts, we find that fertility is positively associated with the existence of child labor, but 
negatively associated with the amount of labor. Elasticities for the second hurdle are estimated to 
be quite high (ε  -3.8), suggesting that households with more children are more likely to have 
child labor, but more children does not imply more child labor; indeed, the opposite is indicated. 
Fuelwood use is again positively related to child labor, but is not significant, in contrast 
to all but a few previous models. This finding perhaps suggests that more and better quality fuels 
are associated with the existence of child labor, but not the amount. Among covariates, we see 
some key differences with the first hurdle. First, the number of females is positively correlated 
and statistically significant in all models. For total child labor, the use of tractors tends to reduce 
child labor as does the number of trips to stores (a key measure of market integration). With the 
exception of numbers of sheep – which require daily grazing – other measures of wealth are not 
correlated with child labor. 
I now cross-check these regression results with non-parametric treatment effects models 
using matched samples based on nearest neighbor propensity score matching. Table 10 reports 
ATTs that measure the average effect on child labor of CPFM indices above the median. For the 
full sample in all but one model, overall CPFM and institutional characteristics indices positively 
affect total and environmental child labor and these estimates are generally statistically 
significant at better than the 1% level. Average effects are also empirically large. For example, if 
households experience above-median levels of these CPFM variables, the average effect is to 
more than double child labor. There is also more than a 50% increase in the probability that 
households use any child labor. ATTs are not significant in models using the sub-sample of 
households with children and, consistent with some other models, management tool ATT 
estimates are not significant. 
In sum, based on four estimation techniques I conclude that more stringent overall CPFM 
generally increases environmental and total child labor in the Bolivian Andes. This conclusion is 
robust to model specification and choice of sample. In no model is the estimated effect of overall 
CPFM on child labor negative and in most cases positive estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant. These findings also hold for the institutional characteristics sub-index; indeed, a 
positive and statistically significant correlation between the institutional characteristics sub-index 
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and child labor is one of the most robust findings. Management tools clearly pull in the opposite 
direction, however, with better management tools reducing child labor.   
5. Conclusions  
This paper examined the so-called wealth paradox with respect to common wealth. We 
do not have data on forest quality and are therefore not able to directly examine common forest 
wealth effects, but instead focus directly on forest management, which has its own appeal.  The 
literature on the meaning and effects of more effective CPFM is indeed clear enough, however, 
that, ceteris paribus, it is hard to imagine households experiencing what we think of as more 
stringent and effective CPFM with lower quality forests. Indeed, throughout the low-income 
developing world, forest devolution and improved CPFM are now considered major tools for 
stemming forest degradation.   
I find that using the overall CPFM index as a measure, more stringent management is 
positively, often elastically, and typically significantly correlated with more child labor.    
Particularly for households exposed to high levels of the institutional characteristics index – 
clarity, fairness, public participation/democracy – child labor appears to be much higher. On the 
other hand, households with higher levels of the management tools index are less likely to use 
child labor and, if they use any child labor, they use less of it. 
I find evidence of a wealth paradox with regard to private land and sheep holdings.  
Though the response is inelastic, households with more agricultural land tend to use more child 
labor. We concur with other authors who have noted the importance of labor for exploiting land.   
I just note that common land should be included as well.   
I find evidence of a child labor wealth paradox for sheep, but not for cattle, which 
appears to affect children by reducing child labor, much like education. Mean sheep holdings 
(9.10) are over six times that of cattle (1.42), which likely are mainly oxen for plowing. Sheep 
are also by their nature much more reliant on grazing than cattle, which is an activity that is 
especially supported by children. It is also notable that grazing occurs on common – possibly 
open access – lands. The zero cost of accessing grazing lands therefore likely distorts child labor, 
causing more child labor and providing an explanation why sheep would be positively related to 
child labor.  
There are at least two possible explanations for the finding that overall CPFM and 
institutional characteristics are positively correlated with child labor. First, it is possible that 
better overall CPFM is really open access in disguise. The institutional characteristics sub-index, 
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which focuses on issues of access clarity, fairness, participation and democracy, is (like the 
overall CPFM index) positively correlated with total and environmental child labor. It is 
therefore possible that respondents who perceive their systems as more clear, fair, participatory 
and democratic perceive them as such because there are few restrictions. In reality, effective 
CPFM management may therefore be wholly in terms of management tools, which – when the 
effect is statistically significant – are negatively related to child labor.   
Second, while the literature to-date has only analyzed private lands, the results may 
suggest a child labor wealth paradox for common lands. What would generate such a common 
land wealth paradox? The literature clearly points to market failures such as missing markets and 
excessive transactions costs as likely explanations. In the Bolivian Andes, as in most of the low-
income developing world, major market and policy failures are quite standard. It is therefore 
possible that the behavioral “paradox” we observe, like previous paradoxes related to 
sharecropping (Cheung 1968), excessive risk aversion (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009) and many 
other issues discussed in the literature, are household responses to highly imperfect and 
challenging environments. More effective CPFM may address one market failure, but in 
interaction with other problems tends to exacerbate child labor. 
  
Environment for Development Bluffstone 
16 
References 
Adhikari, B. (2002) “Property Rights and Natural Resource: Socio-Economic Heterogeneity and 
Distributional Implications of Common Property Resource Management in Nepal.” Paper 
presented at the Second World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, 
June 24-27, 2002, Monterey, California. 
Agrawal, A. (2001) “Commons Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources.” 
World Development 29(10): 1649-1672.  
_______ (2000) “Sustainability on the Commons.” Paper presented at the 8th Biennial 
Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property in 
Bloomington, Indiana.  
Baland, J.-M., and J.-P. Platteau. (1996) Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a 
Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
_________________. (1999) “The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource 
Management.” World Development 27: 773-788. 
Banerjee, A., and E. Duflo. (2007) “The Economic Lives of the Poor.” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21(1): 141-168. 
Basu, K. (1999) “Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International 
Labor Standards.” Journal of Economic Literature 37: 1083-1119. 
Basu, K., and P.H. Van (1998) “The Economics of Child Labor.” American Economic Review 
88(3): 412-427. 
Basu, K, D. Sanghamitra, and D. Bhaskar. (2010) “Child Labor and Household Wealth: Theory 
and Empirical Evidence of an Inverted-U.” Journal of Development Economics 91: 8-14. 
Bhalotra, S. (2007) “Is Child Work Necessary?” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
69(1): 29-55. 
Bhalotra. S., and C. Heady. (2003) “Child Labor: The Wealth Paradox.” World Bank Economic 
Review 17(2): 197-227. 
Bluffstone, R., M. Boscolo, and R. Molina. (2008) “Does Better Common Property Forest 
Management Promote On-Farm Tree Planting: Evidence from Bolivia.” Environment and 
Development Economics 13: 137-170. 
Bromley, D.W. (1990) Essays on the Commons. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Environment for Development Bluffstone 
17 
Cameron, A., and P. K. Trivedi. (2005) Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Castro, J.C.M., and S. Rist. (1999) Tipos de Relaciones Bosque-comunidad y Normas 
Tradicionales de uso y Acceso a la Vegetacion Boscosa. La Paz: AGRUCO and 
PROBONA. 
Cheung, S. (1968) “Private Property Rights and Sharecropping.” Journal of Political Economy 
76(6): 1107-1122.  
Cockburn, J., and B. Dostie. (2007) “Child Work and Schooling: The Role of Household Asset 
Profiles and Poverty in Rural Ethiopia.” Journal of African Economies 16: 519-563. 
Cooke, P. A. (1998) “Intrahousehold Labor Allocation Responses to Environmental Good 
Scarcity: A Case Study from the Hills of Nepal.” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 46(4): 807-830. 
Cooke, P. A. (2000) “Changes in Intrahousehold Labor Allocation to Environmental Goods 
Collection: A Case Study from Rural Nepal, 1982 and 1997.” IFPRI Discussion Paper no. 
87, Washington, D.C., May. 
Cooke, P., G. Kohlin, and W.F. Hyde. (2008) “Fuelwood, Forests and Community Management: 
Evidence from Household Studies.” Environment and Development Economics 13: 103-
135. 
Cragg, J. (1971) “Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Applications to 
the Demand for Durable Goods.” Econometrica 39: 829-844. 
Dasgupta, P. (2000) “Population and Resources: An Explanation of Reproductive and 
Environmental Externalities.” Population and Development Review 24(4): 643-689. 
Dayton-Johnson, J. (2000) “Choosing Rules to Govern the Commons: A Model with Evidence 
from Mexico.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 42(1): 19-41.  
Dumas, C. (2007) “Why Do Parents Make their Children Work? A Test of the Poverty 
Hypothesis in Rural Areas of Burkina Faso.” Oxford Economic Papers 59(2): 301-329. 
Edmonds, E. (2005) “Does Child Labor Decline with Improving Economic Status?” Journal of 
Human Resources 40(1): 77-99. 
Edmonds, E., and C. Turk. (2002) “Child Labor in Transition in Vietnam.” Policy Research 
Working Paper no. 2774. The World Bank Development Research Group, Washington, 
D.C., February. 
Environment for Development Bluffstone 
18 
Filmer, D., and L. Pritchett. (2002) “Environmental Degradation and the Demand for Children: 
Searching for the Vicious Circle in Pakistan.” Environment and Development Economics  
7: 123-146. 
Grootaert, C., and R. Kanbur. (1995) “Child Labour: An Economic Perspective.” International 
Labour Review 134: 187-203.  
Guann, W. (2003) “From the Help Desk: Bootstrapped Standard Errors.” The Stata Journal 3(1): 
71-80.  
Hagemann, F., Y. Diallo, and F. Mehran. (2006) “Global Child Labour Trends 2000 to 2004.” 
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, International Labour 
Office, Geneva, April. 
Heckman, J. (2010) “Building Bridges between Structural and Program Evaluation Approaches 
to Evaluating Policy.” Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 356-398.  
__________. (1979) “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica 47: 153-
161. 
Heltberg, R. (2001) “Determinants and Impacts of Local Institutions for Common Resource 
Management.” Environment and Development Economics 6(2): 183-208. 
Kassie, M., J. Pender, M. Yesuf, G. Kohlin, R. Bluffstone, and E. Mulugeta. (2008) “Estimating 
Returns to Soil Conservation Adoption in the Northern Ethiopian Highlands.” 
Agricultural Economics Journal 38: 213-232.  
Kohlin, G., and G. Amacher. (2005) “Welfare Implications of Community Forest Plantations in 
Developing Countries: The Orissa Social Forestry Project.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 87(4): 855-869. 
Linde-Rahr, M. (2003) “Property Rights and Deforestation: The Choice of Fuelwood Source in 
Rural Viet Nam.” Land Economics 79.  
Mekonnen, A., and R. Bluffstone. (2007) “Increasing Forest Cover in Ethiopia: Lessons from 
Economics and International Experience.” In Policies to Increase Forest Cover in 
Ethiopia, proceedings of a policy workshop organized by the Ethiopian Development 
Research Institute September 18-19, 2007, Addis Ababa.   
Moscoso, R.E., and A.D.I. Villanueva. (1997) Tipos de Relaciones Bosque-comunidad y Normas 
Tradicionales de acceso al Bosque. La Paz: PROBONA and PRADEM/CICDA.  
Environment for Development Bluffstone 
19 
Nepal, M., A. Bohara, and R. Berrens. (2007 “Investigating the Impact of Social Networks on 
Household Forest Conservation Effort in Rural Nepal.” Land Economics 83: 174-191. 
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Perkins, D., S. Radelet, D. Snodgrass, M. Gillis, and M. Roemer. (2001) Economics of 
Development, fifth edition. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Pradhan, A.J., and P.J. Parks. (1995) “Environmental and Socioeconomic Linkages of 
Deforestation and Forest Land Use Change in the Nepal Himalaya." In Hanna, S. and M. 
Munasinghe (eds.) Property Rights in a Social and Ecological Context: Case Studies and 
Design Applications. Beijer Institute and the World Bank. 
Sethi, R., and E. Somanathan. (1996) "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property 
Resource Use." The American Economic Review 86(4): 766-788. 
Singh, I., L. Squire, and J. Strauss (1986) Agricultural Household Models: Extensions, 
Applications, and Policy. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Yesuf, M., and R. Bluffstone. (2009) “Poverty, Risk Aversion and Path Dependence in Low 
Income Countries: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 91(4): 1022-1037. 
 
  
Environment for Development Bluffstone 
20 
Tables 
Table 1. Household Labor Allocations 
      Mean Hours Standard  Deviation Maximum  N 
Home production (e.g. cooking, cleaning) 32.98 22.13 123 304 
Agriculture 50.37 30.55 147 329 
Fuelwood collection 9.77 17.43 175 329 
Grazing 28.07 31.09 252 329 
Fodder collection 10.37 22.23 252 326 
Wage labor 5.31 14.46 110 329 
Total 136.87    
 
Table 2. Percentage of Labor Input by Age and Activity 






Collection Grazing  
Fodder 
Collection Wage Labor 
6 –15 years 13.04% 4.97% 7.14% 15.69% 3.92% 0.00% 
16 – 35 years 31.68% 35.79% 33.67% 36.86% 32.35% 47.17% 
36 – 65 years 42.86% 47.12% 43.88% 39.05% 44.12% 41.51% 
> 65 years  12.42% 12.13% 15.31% 8.39% 19.61% 11.32% 
 
Environment for Development Bluffstone 
21 
Table 3. Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of CPFM Indices.  
All indicesi [0,1] as per (10). Unless noted, survey answers coded such that (5 = definitely, 1 = definitely not) 
Overall Common Property Index X = 0.31, median = 0.31, σ = 0.15 
 
Institutional Characteristics Index  
X = 0.45, median = 0.48, σ =.25 
Management Tools Index X = 0.17,  
median = 0.13, σ = 0.15 
 
SUB-INDICES 
CLARITY OF FOREST ACCESS INDEX  
X = 0.2321, median= 0, σ=0.36 
Is the system that determines who is allowed to gather 
forest products clear and understandable? 
FIXED ALLOTMENTS INDEX X = 0.13, median = 0, σ= 
0.53 
* Are you allocated a fixed allotment of fuelwood per year?  
X = 0.09,  median = 0, σ = 0.28 
 
* Are you allocated a fixed allotment of fodder and grazing 
rights per year?  X = 0.18, median = 0, σ = 0.39 
FAIRNESS IINDEX X = 0.78, median = 0.88, σ = 0.3 
* Do you feel you and others can take the amount of forest 
products that is needed, but not more?  
X = 4.13, median = 5, σ = 1.38 
* Are you getting enough forest products to meet your 
needs, but not more? X = 4.10,median = 5, σ = 1.30 
MONITORING INDEX  X = 0.27, median=  0.17, σ = 0.32 
* Do village authorities carefully monitor who takes what 
products? X = 1.94, median = 1, σ = 1.45 
* Do villagers generally watch who takes forest products?   
X = 1.97, median = 1, σ = 1.45 
* Are you either formally or informally involved in monitoring 
common forest lands? X = 2.31, median = 1, σ = 1.62 
PARTICIPATION & DEMOCRACY INDEX  X = 
0.09, median = 0,  σ = 0.17 
* Do you have influence on policies for deciding how 
much forest products people can take? X =1.38, median = 
1,  σ=.9 
*Do you help decide who are the managers of the forest?  
X = 1.18, median = 1, σ = 0.68 
* Do you expect that in the future you will have the 
opportunity to manage the common forest? X = 1.45, 
median = 1, σ = 0.99 
* Are the managers democratically chosen? X = 1.40, 
median = 1, σ = 1.0 
FORMAL PENALTIES INDEX X = 0.17, median = 0.08,  
σ = 0.22 
* If you took more fuelwood from the forest than you were 
allowed to take, would you be penalized?   
X = 1.51, median = 0, σ = 0.26 
* If you took more fodder from the forest than you were 
allowed to take, would you be penalized?  X = 1.51, median = 
1, σ = 1.06 
* Could you lose some or all of your rights to collect forest 
products if you were caught taking more than your allotment?  
X = 2.03, median = 1, σ = 1.48 
 SOCIAL SANCTION INDEX X = 0.38, median = 0.38, σ= 
0.38 
* Would other villagers be very unhappy with you if they 
found that you had taken more than your allotment?  
X = 2.7, median = 2, σ = 1.70 
* Would you be embarrassed or feel bad if you took more than 
your allotment of forest products? X = 2.47, median =2, σ = 
1.61 
 LABOR INPUT INDEX X = 0.11, median = 0, σ = 0.18 
All below (0, 1, 2, 3,>3 days during past month) 
* Planting common forests  X = 0.37, median = 0, σ = 0.93  
* Watering common forests X = 0.51, median = 0, σ = 1.07 
* Thinning common forests  X = 0.55, median = 0, σ = 1.09 
* Fertilizing common forests  X = 0.28, median = 0, σ = 0.77 
 PAYMENTS INDEX X = 0.03, median = 0, σ = 0.13 
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* Do you have to pay to collect fuelwood?  X = 0.03, median 
= 0, σ = 0.18   
* Do you have to pay to collect fodder and graze? X = 0.03, 
median = 0, σ = 0.17 
 
Table 4. Dependent Variable and First-Stage Potentially Endogenous Variable Descriptive 
Statistics 
 Total Child Labor Environmental Child 
Labor 
Dependent Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. 
Dev.  
Dummy Variable  0.35 0.48 0.22 0.42 
Child Labor in Previous Week  11.97 26.23 5.37 15.74 
 
Potentially Endogenous Independent Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Overall CPFM Index 0.31 0.15 
Institutional Characteristics Index 0.45 0.25 
Management Tools Index 0.17 0.15 
Children in Household 1.46 1.70 
Fuelwood Used Previous Week (Kg) 12.33 14.92 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics, Expected Signs and Reasons for Including Variables 
Exogenous Covariates Mean Expected Sign/Reason for Including 
Dummy variable if household has an 
improved lorena stove (LORENA) 
0.47 (-) Lorena stove adoption proxies for exogenous labor saving 
technology adoption and innovation by the household, which reduces 
child labor. 
Log of total estimated on-farm tree years 
(TREEYEAR) 
29.25 (-) Past on-farm tree investments may loosen labor constraints, 
reducing current demand for child labor 
Electricity dummy (ELECTRICITY) 0.026 (-) Households with electricity use less biomass fuels and may have 
looser labor constraints, reducing current child labor. 
Males in household (MALES) 2.00 (?) Adjusts for household composition  
Number of females (FEMALES) 1.79 
Tractor plowing dummy (TRACTOR) 0.063 (-) Households who adopt more advanced technologies are likely to 
utilize less child labor.  Tractors also save labor. 
Highest level of education of any 
household member (1=none, 3=some 
secondary; 9=masters/ Ph.D.) 
(EDUCATION) 
3.70 (-) Households with more educated members are likely to be more 
willing to invest in all assets, including children. 
Years family and ancestors lived in village 
(1= <5; 7= >100 (YEARS) 
6.09 (?) Adjusts for unobservable fixed investments and local social 
capital. 
Spanish language speaker (SPANISH) 0.85  
(?) There may be systematic cultural elements associated with use of 
child labor. 
Aymara language speaker (AYMARA) 0.25 
Quechua language speaker (QUECHUA) 0.74 
Number of times meat eaten during 
previous month (MEAT) 
2.25 (-) Proxy for income when production largely non-marketed.  Ceteris 
paribus, higher income can be partly spent on children. 
Times to store in past week (0 = none; 4 = 
6 to 7; 7 = >12) (STORE) 
1.58  
(?) Households that are more proximate to and/or integrated with 
markets are likely to have higher incomes, better access to schools and 
more information, which may reduce child labor. Substitution effects 
also exist, potentially increasing child labor 
Expenditures in Bolivianos/month ($1=8B) 
(EXPENDITURES) 
13.36 
Time to market where respondent most 
often goes in minutes (TIME) 
120.6 
Credit access dummy (BORROW) 0.17 (-) Credit smoothes consumption and reduces risk, facilitating all 
investments, including in children 
Land controlled by household in hectares 
(LAND) 
1.47  
(?) Households with more land and animals are wealthier, yielding 
income effects, but these assets also require labor to exploit, 
potentially increasing child labor 
Number of cattle (CATTLE)  1.42 
Number of sheep (SHEEP) 9.10 
 
Excluded Exogenous Variables for Estimating First-Stage Regressions 
 
Village-Level Variables from Survey of Village Leaders 
Department Dummies (La Paz default)  Unobserved heterogeneity  
Major ethnic group in village (1 = 
Quechua; 2 = Aymara; 3= Other) 
(ETHNIC) 1.30 
Possible village-level cultural norms impact all first-stage variables, 
but likely not child labor directly 
Number of households in village 
(VIL_HH) 535.2 
Large and disbursed communities with more area have more difficulty 
coordinating. CPFM indices likely lower, but effect on children and 





Households are clustered rather than 
disbursed (clustered = 1; 0 = disbursed) 
(CLUSTER) 0.46 




Estimated agricultural area of village 
(hectares) (AG_AREA) 1598 
Estimated village pasture land (hectares) 
(PASTURE) 1914 
Timber cutting is explicitly regulated 
(1=regulated; 0=not regulated) (TIMBER) 0.55 
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Fuelwood collection explicitly regulated 
(1=regulated; 0=not regulated) 
(FUELWOOD)  
 
Reported village-level management systems, which are related to on-
the-ground CPFM, and reflect other norms, but likely do not impact 
child labor directly Any regulations on forests are recognized 
in formal laws (1=formal laws; 0=not by 
laws) (LAWS) 0.33 
Any regulations on forests are recognized 
by custom (1=custom; 0=not by custom) 
(CUSTOM) 0.78 
Villagers can sell their land (1=can sell; 
0=cannot sell) (SELL) 0.55 
Household-Level Variables from Household Survey  
Goats (GOATS) 3.34 Animals that represent important wealth, but do not require significant 
labor, therefore unlikely to affect child labor. Donkeys (DONKEYS) 0.76 
Men in household 16-35 years old 
(MALES 16-35) 0.56 
 
 
Adult composition of the household likely will affect views on actual 
CPFM system, fertility and fuel use, but not child labor. 
Men in household ≥ 65 years old 
(MALES≥65) 0.18 
Women in household 16-35 years old 
(FEMALES 16-35) 0.44 
Women in household ≥65 years old 
(FEMALES≥65) 0.13 
Frequency of using fuelwood (3=2x daily, 
0=never) for fuel (FREQ_FW) 1.71 
 
 
Fuel preferences without regard to amount will likely affect 
respondent views on CPFM system and fuel use, but not child labor. 
Frequency of using dry mosses (3=2x 
daily, 0=never) for fuel (FREQ_MOSS) 0.77 
Frequency of using gas (3=2x daily, 
0=never) for fuel (FREQ_GAS) 1.42 
Frequency of using crop residues (3=2x 
daily, 0=never) for fuel 
(FREQ_CROPRES) 0.25 
Rank of animal bedding (1 lowest, 7 
highest) from own trees (BED) 0.71 
 
Preferences related to on-farm trees relate to fuelwood consumption 
and CPFM system, but not child labor Rank of shade/ambience (1 lowest, 7 
highest) from own trees (SHADE) 3.56 
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Table 6. First Stage Regression Results Full Sample 
OLS with Robust Standard Errors Adjusted for Village Clustering (p values in parentheses) 
 CPFM Indices   
Dependent  







Children  Fuelwood Use 
(Kilograms) 
Exogenous Covariates 
LORENA    0.0272 (0.22) 0.086 (0.01)*** 0.0249  (0.21) 0.0741 (0.49) -1.5632  (0.46) 
TREEYEARS 0.0001 (0.80) 0.0002 (0.34) -0.0001 (0.60) -0.0009(0.23) -0.0073 (0.68) 
ELECTRICITY -0.0110 (0.77) -0.0326 (0.60) 0.0105 (0.79) -0.947 (0.00)*** -2.1475 (0.57) 
MALES 0.0076 (0.28) 0.0118 (0.21) 0.0034 (0.69) 0.861 (0.00)*** 1.1309 (0.17) 
FEMALES 0.0036 (0.64) 0.0108 (0.32) -0.0037 (0.68) 0.866 (0.00)*** 0.8906 (0.34) 
TRACTOR    -0.0343 (0.27) -0.0470 (0.46) -0.0217 (0.62) 0.2002 (0.36) -0.1277 (0.97) 
EDUCATION -0.0126 (0.01)*** -0.024 (0.00)*** -0.0017 (0.77) -0.046 (0.10)* -0.2294 (0.66) 
YEARS 0.0039 (0.64) 0.0049 (0.69) 0.0030 (0.75) -0.081 (0.08)* 0.3977 (0.65) 
SPANISH 0.0058 (0.77) 0.0221 (0.50) -0.0105 (0.61) -0.098 (0.48) 1.7438 (0.39) 
AYMARA 0.0143 (0.74) -0.0083 (0.88) 0.0369 (0.40) -0.145 (0.49) -0.0078 (0.99) 
QUECHUA -0.0784 (0.06)* -0.0308 (0.59) -0.13 (0.00)*** -0.072 (0.79) 5.4426 (0.09)* 
MEAT 0.0147 (0.09)* 0.0254 (0.06)* 0.0040 (0.68) 0.0581 (0.28) -0.1320 (0.87) 
STORE 0.0072 (0.18) 0.0117 (0.11) 0.0026 (0.68) 0.0147 (0.68) -0.1226 (0.85) 
EXPENDITURE -0.0004 (0.22) -0.0003 (0.62) -0.001 (0.10)* 0.0009 (0.68) -0.0056 (0.88) 
TIME 0.0001 (0.15) 0.0001 (0.03)** 0.0000 (0.79) 0.0000 (0.93) -0.0046 (0.27) 
BORROW 0.0464 (0.05)** 0.0115 (0.75) 0.081 (0.0)*** 0.1316 (0.44) -3.7944 (0.11) 
LAND 0.0000 (0.32) 0.0000 (0.33) 0.0000 (0.35) 0.0000 (0.89) 0.0000 (0.29) 
CATTLE -0.0078 (0.11) -0.017 (0.01)*** 0.0013 (0.77) 0.0130 (0.54) 0.2213 (0.63) 
SHEEP 0.0002 (0.38) -0.0001 (0.84) 0.0004 (0.07)* -0.003 (0.04)** 0.0446 (0.42) 
CONSTANT 0.2817 (0.07)* 0.4000 (0.085)* 0.1634 (0.33) -0.995 (0.28) 1.6693 (0.94) 
Excluded Instruments 
COCHABAMBA 0.1294 (0.20) 0.1852 (0.21) 0.0736 (0.48) 0.1649 (0.79) -9.6057 (0.38) 
ORURO -0.0769 (0.44) -0.2240 (0.14) 0.0702 (0.51) 0.4034 (0.52) -9.7384 (0.41) 
CHUQUISACA 0.1979 (0.06)* 0.2646 (0.08)* 0.1312 (0.22) 0.1911 (0.78) -5.7399 (0.61) 
POTOSI -0.0489 (0.62) -0.1873 (0.19) 0.0894 (0.38) 0.0177 (0.98) -14.2741 (0.21) 
ETHNIC 0.0373 (0.46) 0.0539 (0.45) 0.0207 (0.69) 0.0314 (0.92) -1.2569 (0.85) 
VIL_HH 0.0000 (0.33) 0.0000 (0.20) 0.0000 (0.97) 0.0000 (0.84) -0.0009 (0.37) 
CLUSTER -0.0473 (0.03)** -0.0649 (0.07)* -0.0296 (0.21) 0.1934 (0.13) -1.8444 (0.29) 
AREA 0.0000 (0.65) 0.0000 (0.79) 0.0000 (0.46) 0.0000 (0.06)* 0.0000 (0.36) 
AG_AREA 0.0000 (0.34) 0.0000 (0.92) 0.0000 (0.06)* 0.0000 (0.66) -0.0001 (0.75) 
PASTURE 0.0645 (0.02)** 0.0790 (0.03)** 0.0501 (0.11) 0.0746 (0.66) -3.8272 (0.19) 
TIMBER -0.1048 (0.00)*** -0.1028 (0.04)** -0.11 (.01)*** -0.260 (0.23) 1.5214 (0.61) 
FUELWOOD 0.0637 (0.15) 0.0222 (0.73) 0.105 (0.03)** 0.1501 (0.56) 4.7506 (0.26) 
LAWS 0.0373 (0.16) 0.0685 (0.08)* 0.0062 (0.83) -0.161 (0.36) 2.3784 (0.39) 
CUSTOM -0.0431 (0.39) -0.1047 (0.16) 0.0184 (0.75) 0.5154 (0.06)* -0.5991 (0.87) 
SELL -0.0016 (0.95) -0.0208 (0.62) 0.0176 (0.59) -0.368 (0.04)** 4.0626 (0.12) 
GOATS -0.0016 (0.17) -0.0004 (0.79) -0.003 (0.02)** 0.0051 (0.43) 0.0336 (0.83) 
DONKEYS -0.0013 (0.88) 0.0012 (0.91) -0.0037 (0.67) -0.045 (0.16) 0.8011 (0.26) 
MALES 16-35 -0.0075 (0.56) -0.0121 (0.52) -0.0029 (0.86) -0.678 (0.00)*** 0.5050 (0.81) 
MALES ≥ 65 -0.0023 (0.91) -0.0090 (0.78) 0.0043 (0.86) -0.138 (0.30) -1.0854 (0.60) 
FEMALES 16-35 0.0127 (0.44) -0.0043 (0.85) 0.0297 (0.08)* -0.317 (0.00)*** -2.0040 (0.30) 
FEMALES ≥ 65 -0.0090 (0.69) 0.0188 (0.63) -0.0369 (0.13) -0.454 (0.00)*** 0.7594 (0.76) 
FREQ_FW 0.0059 (0.48) -0.0021 (0.88) 0.0138 (0.13) 0.0038 (0.94) 5.552 (0.00)*** 
FREQ_MOSS 0.0055 (0.83) 0.0123 (0.69) -0.0012 (0.97) 0.0152( 0.90) 4.7528 (0.14) 
FREQ_GAS 0.0031 (0.73) 0.0127 (0.39) -0.0066 (0.53) 0.0999 (0.05)** -0.7553 (0.43) 
FREQ_CROPRES 0.0345 (0.01)*** 0.0240 (0.29) 0.05 (0.00)*** 0.1473 (0.09)* 2.0802 (0.21) 
BED -0.0071 (0.11) -0.0009 (0.89) -0.01 (0.0)*** 0.0234 (0.38) -0.3953 (0.40) 
SHADE -0.0028 (0.34) -0.0040 (0.36) -0.0015 (0.58) -0.012 (0.47) 0.3050 (0.39) 
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F(  46,    207) 11.73 8.97 8.97 58.48 24.40 
Prob > F 0.00*** 0.000*** 0.00*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Adj R-squared 0.4129 0.34 0.34 0.85 0.33 
N 254 254 254 254 254 
P values in parentheses *, **, *** Indicate Significance at Least at the 10%, 5% and 1% Levels.  
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Table 7. 2SLS IV Regression Models of Child Labor with Different CPFM Measures                            
Robust Standard Errors Adjusted for Village Clustering  
 2SLS IV Regression 
Total Child Labor 
2SLS IV Regression 
Environmental Child Labor1 
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INSTITUTIONAL 












































































































































































































































































































LAND 0.0000 1.2105 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
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(0.96) (0.45) (0.46) (0.42) (0.09)* (0.36) (0.01)*** (0.07)* 


















































Goodness of Fit Tests 
R2 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.27 
Wald test  1046.53 
































































Overidentifying Restrictions Tests 
































Weak Instruments – Shea’s Partial R2 
COMMON  
PROPERTY INDEX 
0.30 0.35 -  0.30 0.35   
INSTITUTIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
  0.36 0.43   0.36 0.43 
MANAGEMENT 
TOOLS 
  0.25 0.30   0.25 0.30 
CHILDREN 0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  
FUELWOOD USE 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 
Observations 254 150 254 150 254 150 254 150 
P values in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance at least at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
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Table 8. Probit Models of Child Labor with Different CPFM Measures                              
Robust Standard Errors Adjusted for Village Clustering  
 Total Child Labor Environmental Child Labor1 
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INSTITUTIONAL 






















































































































































































































































































BORROW 0.0155 -0.0288 0.0746 0.0218 -0.0814 -0.1558  -0.0662 -0.1294 
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Pseudo R2 0.39 0.15 0.42 0.18 0.37 0.23 0.37 0.24 
Wald test of 




d.f. = 3 
χ2=3.80 
(p=0.15)  









d.f. = 3 
χ2=10.77 
(p=0.00) 
d.f. = 2 
χ2=13.12
(p=0.01) 
d.f. = 4 
χ2=13.29 
(p=0.0 ) 
d.f. = 3 
Wald χ2 298.82 































Observations 288 170 288 170 267 159 267 159 
P values in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance at least at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
1
 In models of environmental child labor, including ownership of a tractor caused the variance matrix to be close to 
singular. It was therefore necessary to drop that variable. Wald χ
2
 tests of endogeneity indicate that the package of 
potentially endogenous variables are indeed endogenous. Due to limited observations, marginal effects for the IV 
Probit could not be generated. For comparability, Probit results are therefore reported, but IV Probit coefficient 
estimates available from the author. 
2
 HHs stands for “households.” 
3 
Of course, because no households are without children, the variable CHILDREN is dropped from these models. 
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Table 9. Second Step of Double Hurdle Truncated Regression Models of Child Labor with 
Different CPFM Measures  
Bootstrapped (1000 Repetitions) Robust Standard Errors Adjusted for Village Clustering  
 Total Child Labor Environmental Child Labor 

















































(0.60)   
INSTITUTIONAL 








































































































































































































































































































TIME 0.0075 -0.0015 0.0057 -0.0043 0.0061 0.0017 0.0059 0.0013 
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Wald test of 
exogeneity based on 
IV Probit 
63.03 




















Observations 101 101 101  66  66  
P values in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance at least at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
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Table 10. Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) Using Nearest Neighbor 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
 Total Child Labor Environmental Child Labor 

















































































t statistics in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance at least at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
1 
For all models using this treatment and full sample N = 329. Total treated 189 and 173 matched. Matched treated = 
163. Matched control = 80.  
2 
For all models using this treatment and full sample N = 329. Total treated 189 and 174 matched. Matched treated = 
189. Matched control = 74.  
3 
For all models using this treatment and full sample N = 329. Total treated 188 and 167 matched. Matched treated = 
188. Matched control = 82.  
4 
For all models using this treatment and sub-sample of households with children N = 190. Total treated 129 and 119 
matched. Matched treated = 129. Matched control = 37.  
5 
For all models using this treatment and sub-sample of households with children N = 190.  Total treated 125 and 
118 matched.  Matched treated = 125.  Matched control = 38.  
6 
For all models using this treatment and sub-sample of households with children N = 190. Total treated 107 and 94 
matched. Matched treated = 107. Matched control = 42.  
 
 
 
